Part III of this analysis examines the implications of the single most interesting data point to emerge from the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India. This date has never been mentioned in earlier media reports, and what is almost startlingly significant is not only what transpired on this date, but the fact of the date, itself.
Part II of this analysis examines how the defence ministry’s Contract Negotiation Committee (CNC) interpreted an inflated cost analysis of the Eurofighter bid and undervalued the cost of the Rafale bid, five times.
Part I of this three-part analysis is a contextual reading of the February 2019 CAG report and outlines how the IAF’s MMRCA contest was fixed to get the Rafale back into the contest after it was rejected, three times, and how the threats to a Rafale win were removed.
Even after two decades since the acquisition case, the Very Short Range Air Defence (VSHORAD) search has seen a system absent from trials and failing trials, being passed as technically compliant and ending up as, apparently, the cheapest. Also problematic is the difficulty its purchase could pose by provoking U.S. sanctions under their CAATSA.
The joint statement said, “The Ministers committed to start exchanges between the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and the Indian Navy.” NAVCENT is part of CENTCOM and, both, the NAVCENT and the U.S. Fifth Fleet are headquartered in Manama, Bahrain with a common commander.
Taken literally, the defence minister’s words could have signified a change in India’s nuclear deterrence policy, which is structured around No First Use followed by ‘massive retaliation’.
DRDO Chairman S. Christopher told the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence about a requirement of INR 800 crore to develop the LCA Mk2, adding the IAF had committed to 201 fighters.
The defence ministry has provided a singular and unconvincing defence of why it did not ask for, or entertain, a competing commercial offer for the Eurofighter Typhoon pitched by Airbus.
