The Trouble with ToD
Alternatives, Duration, Training and Unit Dynamics are why it wouldn't work

Brigadier Rajiv Williams (retired) explains the problems with the recently-floated idea of a three-year Tour of Duty in the army and recommends, instead, a greater focus on increasing the flexibility and attractiveness of existing entry channels into the Indian Army.

ToD is the abbreviation for the ‘Tour on Duty’ concept floated recently to describe a new type of ‘Entry Scheme’ into the Indian Army that could, perhaps, in due course lead to entry into the other two services of the armed forces, as well.

Proponents of this new scheme say it will offer an opportunity to youth to experience the discipline of the military while boosting the numbers of the army. But a closer examination of the idea raises questions about the effectiveness of the idea.

Flexibility in Short Service

It has been argued that the scheme will help reduce defence expenditure. The analysis carried out suggests that the investment on a ToD officer will be around INR 80 to 85 lakh at the time of his exit, which is much lower in comparison to the supposed expenditure of INR 5.12 to 6.78 crore incurred on a Short Service Commissioned officer, who exits after his or her service engagement term of 10/14 years.

But it is important to examine if this merits an entry scheme separate from the tested Short Service Commissioned Officers (SSCOs) scheme, where officers have the option to either continue to serve up to 10 or 14 years, unless they seek permanent commission through a selection process.

This Short Service scheme used to run for five years, earlier, which was more attractive and optimal since an officer could subsequently begin a civilian career at a relatively younger age. There is no reason this minimum service limit cannot be brought down to five years instead of this separate ToD scheme. The SSCO scheme could be further refined with the an option of maximum service pegged at, say, eight and twelve years, offering greater flexibility.

This will also not deprive the officers of the gratuity due to them after five years of service. Even better, officers could even be offered the option of seeking release from Short Service after three years without any gratuity, upon their own volition.

Reduced Training

Part of this discussion has focused on a reduction of the training periods of officers and men seeking the ToD entrance route. Speaking from experiences as Adjutant at the Indian Military Academy and Commandant of my Infantry Regimental Training Centre, there is no way to shorten the duration of training for officers and men without compromising it, altogether. Any such consideration is startlingly amateurish and must be rejected outright.

Unit Dynamics

But let’s assume an officer has completed his shortened ToD training and joined his unit, for the sake of testing the idea. Today, man-management can be a challenge in a unit with a mix of young Regular and Commissioned officers. During my experience as a young officer we had Emergency Commissioned officers in our battalion, as well.

This is where psychology, perception and unit dynamics come in with additional complexity, when the other officers of the unit are aware that the ToD entrant is a ‘guest’ for three years. The command challenges will become increasingly evident when it comes to tasking at different levels to include levels of leading and being led.

And then, with no real command opportunity being available to the ToD entrant variety, his very presence in a unit would likely become awkward, especially when he becomes senior in time served to a Regular or a Short Service officer. Juniors may then even challenge his capabilities, especially if the ToD officer is not given opportunities to upgrade his skills by attending professional military courses, which are offered to the other young officers of the same battalion.

But if the ToD officer is detailed on courses then how much time does he spend with his unit? How will the scheme fulfill the very objective of making manpower available for which it is being designed?

Some officers and veterans in favour of the scheme have cited their experience during their command tenures on the performance of young officers from other arms and services, who were attached to their units for a period of one year. They feel, mistakenly, that similar performance levels can be expected from the ToD entrees. Such an expectation is belied on two counts.

Firstly, at the level of troops under command of a ToD officer and secondly at the level of the Commanding Officer assigning a particular responsibility to the ToD officer. The timing of task allocation is important and needs to be considered deliberately because the outcomes are going to be different if the task is allocated in the first or second year of service, vis-à-vis a task allocated in his third year of service.

In fact, there could be another dimension to such tasking on the acceptance piece by a ToD officer, who may question his superior on such tasking, which may well be a life-threatening operationally hazardous task given a few months before his release from service. The same may also be the case for the senior officer assigning the task to the ToD officer of his own unit.

These realities will have a direct impact on both the Command and the commanded. It is in this context that we need to analyze the psychological impact on all troops, including commanders and ToD officers in such circumstances. The ToD officer may exit with a heavy heart as he internally evaluates and compares his contribution to his colleagues who serve longer, which could have a negative impact on his personality at the time of his departure from service.

Focus on Short Service and NCC entry

The ToD scheme in its present form is unlikely to achieve its purpose or expected level of efficiency for which it has been designed. The shortfall in officers and men cannot be wished away by inviting entry through a tour on duty scheme for a period of three years in the army. It is possible that the essence of the ToD scheme could be employed to fit into the recruitment policy of the army in some form and to that extent, the essential recommendations of the study conducted on the ToD scheme can be meshed into the existing recruitment profiling system.

But a wiser course would be to further refine and strengthen current recruitment systems with a special focus on existing Short Service and NCC entrance schemes. It is in strengthening these established structures that the army can build capacity and further enhance motivational content of all ranks.

Brigadier Rajiv Williams was commissioned into The Brigade of Guards in November 1971 and participated in the Indo-Pak war of 1971. In 1987, he served in the Siachen Glacier with his Unit, 8 JAK LI (SIACHEN), which captured the world’s highest post at an altitude of 21,143 feet and three months later defended BilaFonda. Brigadier Williams has served as an instructor and Adjutant, Indian Military Academy, and commanded his unit in Arunachal Pradesh and his Regimental Centre at Srinagar. He retired shortly after commanding a mountain brigade in the Kargil sector and is a recipient of the Yudh Seva Medal. Brigadier Williams has co-authored books on Siachen Glacier, Indian Military Academy and the Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry Regiment. He tweets under the handle @rajiv1951.